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The article reviews the institutional change of local public 
service provision in China. The emphasis is placed on the 
characteristics and reasons of the evolution process. The 
first part presents the characteristics and changes of local 
public service provision in five periods. The second part 
analyses public service provision through structural-in-
strumental, cultural, and environmental perspectives. The 
third part explores whether China has experienced “pen-
dulum-type” movements like some European countries. 
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The institutional change of local public service in China 
is incremental. Although it shows some convergence with 
the trend of certain European countries, it retains special 
features.
Keywords: China, local public service, institutional change, 
remunicipalization
1. Introduction
In China, both state capacity and administrative professionalization have 
increased. Simultaneously, a tremendous economic development has tak-
en place, reflected in an average GDP growth of 9.8 per cent per year 
for two decades until 2010. However, it is undeniable that prosperity has 
not spread across the whole society and some undesirable consequenc-
es have emerged, such as inadequate healthcare, unaffordable housing, 
the disparities between education in rural and urban areas, etc. For the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and government the biggest challenge 
in the present-day China is to provide good governance and handle the 
challenging consequences of economic reforms (Saich, 2011). Who will 
face these challenges and address them?
“All Chinese politics is local” – it is often said (Zhou et al., 2007). The 
four levels of local governments in China (provincial, prefectural, county, 
and municipal) are involved in providing public services. Sub-provincial 
levels have considerable expenditure responsibilities; which makes China 
somewhat special in comparative perspective, and this is especially true 
at the county and municipal levels (World Bank, 2002). Therefore, it is 
necessary to focus on China’s public service provision at the local level, 
which is the main theme of this paper. 
The key concepts of public service and remunicipalisation need to be 
clarified here. Although the terminology of public services differs from 
country to country, to make the comparative research more feasible, pub-
lic utilities (water, energy, public transport) as well as the provision of 
social services (elder care, social housing etc.) and health services have 
been selected for analysis in this paper. Remunicipalization refers to the 
“reverse” process when functionally privatized (“outsourced”) functions 
and services are turned back into public/municipal operation or materially 
privatised assets are “purchased back” and returned to public/municipal 
ownership, be it entirely or partially (Wollmann, 2013). This new trend 
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has emerged in some European countries and generated considerable in-
terest among researchers.
2. Changing Local Public Services Provision
2.1.  Maoist Era: Cellular Structure and Self-Reliance 
(1949–1978)
There is a general perception that up until 1978 the Chinese system had 
performed well in terms of providing basic public goods and services (Sa-
ich, 2008), since it achieved universal and equal availability of public ser-
vice (Yu, 2014). It is a good example of sustaining social development 
through public expenditure at low-income levels (Dreze, Sen, 1989). Al-
though most scholars held the consensus that it was an egalitarian gov-
ernment taking care of the whole public service system (allocation system; 
Yu, 2014), it seems, however, that there were two distinctive features: lo-
calism instead of unified and centralized system, and a self-reliant system 
not entirely financed by the state.
The cellular structure existed in the local public service provision system 
based on the urban workplace (danwei) and rural communes. Danwei is 
a generic term denoting the Chinese socialist workplace and the specific 
range of practices that it embodies (Bary, 2005). Each work unit func-
tioned as a self-sufficient “welfare society” within which an individual 
received employment and income protection, and enjoyed heavily subsi-
dized benefits and services such as housing, food, education, recreation, 
child care, and social security benefits for sickness, maternity, work injury, 
invalidity and death, and old age (Leung, 1994). The commune system 
experienced an evolvement from mutual-aid group, an elementary coop-
erative, to an advanced cooperative system. The peasants were locked in 
a rural bondage of tight control, low productivity and bare subsistence 
(Selden, 1993) and got the most basic services from the collective group. 
Therefore, it would be correct to say that the job assignment, the distri-
bution of grain, and other necessities were unified and central, but the 
provision of local public service was cellular and place-specific.
Self-reliance (zi li geng sheng), the primary principle for providing public 
services, demanded the lower level organizations to develop capacity in 
accordance with their own resources with minimal dependence on high-
er levels. This situation was same with what happened in the economy 
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area, when Mao promoted the principle of self-reliance, which essential-
ly implied the establishment of a comprehensive, independent economic 
system not only at the national, but also at the regional and local levels, 
even down to the level of the communal and the individual enterprise 
(Chai, 2011). Since local governments could not control the revenue and 
expenditure of the local public services, municipalities in this period were 
operators without much financial support and state aid was limited to 
places too poor to carry out their duties.
Public Utilities. For cities, government had a top-down and state-centric 
approach to transport management. The transportation projects were fi-
nanced mainly by the central state budget. Other tasks besides finance, 
including design, construction, operation, and management, were as-
signed to 100% state–owned enterprises (SOEs; Mu et al., 2011). For 
the countryside, those local entities, production brigades and communes, 
were responsible for mobilizing financial and human resources for public 
projects including water conservancy facilities such as ditches, irrigation 
channels and reservoirs, local roads, and buses.
Social Services. Related to elderly care, for the privileged group and office 
employees, the state was responsible for financing pensions by determin-
ing the rates and then enterprises remitted three per cent of their payrolls 
as contributions to an enterprise pension fund (Frazier, 2004), which was 
collected by the trade union. For the village residents, as an alternative 
way of the absence of state responsibility, care for the seniors had been 
the sole responsibility of the family. Related to housing, the allocation 
system in the old-style public housing provision involved two stages: the 
state allocated public rental housing to work units, then the work units 
distributed the housing to individual households (Yang, Chen, 2014).
2.2.  Opening up and Reform: Municipalisation Followed  
by Immature Marketization (1978–2001)
In the post-1978 era, state and collective institutions in rural and urban 
China that had previously carried much of the welfare burden, discarded 
many of their responsibilities and policymakers struggled to devise new 
policies and institutions to provide welfare services (Saich, 2008). Local 
public services provision in this stage had three distinctive features. First, 
the responsibility for social welfare was transferred from the workplaces 
to local governments and street offices. China operated a supply-side ap-
proach to policymaking in providing public services. The central govern-
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ment set public policy goals but they were insufficiently funded mandates, 
with the burden of implementation falling on local government (Saich, 
2008). Furthermore, there was the programme of community construc-
tion (shequjianshe, promoted by the Ministry of Civil Affairs since the mid-
1990s (Figure 1).The street office was responsible for the provision of a 
variety of community services including both public and social services. 
Although it looked like the government had created new collective organ-
izations to take over the collective aspects of work and service provision 
that had been provided by the workplace (Bary, 2005), modernization 
and urbanization weakened the service delivery model that was based on 
residence, workplace-oriented, and family provided welfare.
Figure 1: Organization of urban government
Source: Yusuf, Saich, 2008
Second, a diversity of service delivery provision emerged. The Deng Xiaop-
ing’s leadership proposed the slogan of socialization, which was termed 
“small state, big society” (xiao zhengfu, da shehui), but Wong argued that 
Chinese-style socialization was another form of privatization (Wong, 
1994). The state was in clear retreat: its role in the provision, funding, 
and regulation of social care was curtailed. Following this, the public ser-
vices arrangement was transformed from a wholly public one into a pub-
lic-private hybrid one. However, with the rather immature marketization 
and commercialization, unaffordable access and low availability of public 
services was common because recipients had to pay for services in most 
welfare fields. This change was particularly evident in the area of social 
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insurance (pensions, medical care, and the newly created unemployment 
insurance) and higher education (Khan, Riskin, 2001).
Third, more inequality can be observed between urban and rural areas 
and among different social groups. There was no public service in the 
rural areas in the 1980s and 1990s (Yu, 2014). Besides, the urbanization 
and infusion of foreign investment brought new problems to the local gov-
ernment. Migrant workers did not have equal access to state-subsidized 
benefits provided by public agencies and/or their employers, and they had 
to rely primarily on their families for housing, healthcare, support servic-
es, and other necessities (Xu et al., 2011). This population created new 
challenges as China’s towns and cities strived to knit fragmented social 
welfare provision into a more coherent framework of support (Yusuf, Sa-
ich, 2008).
Public Utilities. China’s water sector suffered from poor operating effi-
ciency and slow technological upgrades because of lack of operational ex-
pertise of government staff, due to traditional operating of water utilities 
at low levels of water tariffs established as part of welfare (Browder et al., 
2007). In the late 1990s, these complex challenges led the Chinese gov-
ernment to allow private sector participation in the effective management 
and operation of water and wastewater plants earlier monopolized by the 
public sector (Choi et al., 2010). As regards the transport, many ineffi-
cient SOEs were closed down or privatized; new private enterprises (PEs) 
entered the transport sector engaging in project construction, financing, 
operation, and management. For the energy sector, private participation 
in infrastructure development in China was first seen for the power indus-
try during the 1980s in the form of build-operate-transfer (BOT) (Ke et 
al., 2011).1
Social Services. Regarding elderly care, the 1990s witnessed an ongoing 
shift towards the mixture of social pooling and individual accounts for 
urban enterprise employees (World Bank, 1997). A three-pillar pension 
system consisting of a state pension scheme, a supplementary enterprise 
scheme, and a personal savings plan was established (Shi, Mok, 2012). In 
housing provision, China’s employer-based welfare housing programme 
was formally abolished in 1998 and an overwhelming majority of the pub-
lic housing stock was quickly privatized in the early twenty-first century 
1 Shenzhen Shajiao B Power Plant, in operation since 1988, is regarded as the first 
BOT project in China (Qiao et al., 2002). Several state-approved BOT projects have been 
granted since late 1996, such as the Shanghai Da Chang Water Project, Changsha Power 
Project and Chengdu Water Project (Wang, Tiong, 2000).
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(Zhao, Bourassa, 2003). Subsequently the SOEs’ role was changed from 
housing buyers to housing sellers (Miao, Rajah, 2014), and then commer-
cial housing became the main option for urban residents.
2.3.  New Century: Deeper pluralism and Partial 
Demunicipalisation (2002–2007)
Fearing potential social unrest arising from general dissatisfaction with the 
State’s ability to address social inequalities, the central government began 
to be increasingly involved in the public services delivery. The Hu-Wen 
leadership pledged a new approach based on the idea of a ‘harmonious so-
ciety’, ‘people-centred development’, and ‘service-oriented government’, 
trying to build a new public service system with the aim of “equalization 
of basic public service”. Another marked characteristic of this period was 
further development of the pluralism of public service providers and pro-
viding ways, including deeper marketization and non-profit participation. 
During the reform period, local governments were experimenting with 
service delivery through a variety of mechanisms: contracts and conces-
sions to not-for-profit and for-profit organizations, public-private joint 
ventures, and informal and voluntary cooperation (Saich, 2008).
Referring to the for-profit organization, the 2002 Government Procure-
ment Law allowed contracting to the private sector for the provision of 
support functions, social services, and public works projects. They utilized 
franchises for public services such as passenger transportation and gar-
bage disposal, and vouchers for elderly home care (Teets, 2012). About 
the non-profit organization, the statistics of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(MCA) showed that before 1978 there had been only about 6,000 social 
organizations in China. By the end of 2006, their number had reached 
186,000. Enterprises, social groups, and individuals had set up about 
700,000 not-for-profit institutions to provide social services. This category 
included private schools, hospitals, community service centres, vocation-
al training centres, research institutes, and recreational facilities (Yusuf, 
Saich, 2008). As multiple cities explored the possibility of contracting out 
government services, the purchase of public services by governments from 
NGOs became a new public service model. 
Public Utilities. From 1993 to 2007, the provision of transport infrastruc-
ture services in China moved away from the realm of government to that 
of the private sector through PPPs. From roads to ports, and later to sub-
ways, state-owned monopolistic enterprises gave way to a wide range of 
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private players operating in a relatively competitive environment, but with 
far from complete economic regulation (Huang et al., 2009). New in-
stitutional framework consisted of independent regulatory agencies such 
as project tendering committees, competition law and amended property 
rights law. PPP water projects also gained increasing popularity in the 
market and more than 500 projects had utilized the build-operate-transfer 
(BOT), transfer-operate-transfer (TOT), and divestiture business models 
until 2009. For foreign investment, 2002 was a turning point, the en-
tire municipal water service sector, including water distribution networks, 
were opened to foreign investment (Jang, 2014). Regarding the energy 
provision, the landmark Scheme for the Reform of the Power Industry 
was enacted in 2002 and was aimed at developing market-oriented elec-
tricity system. However, the serious power shortage during 2003–2004 
made expansion of generating capacity more important than market-ori-
ented reform. The central government invested huge amounts of treasury 
bonds in infrastructure construction, and was determined to clean up the 
illegal projects, which led to a fadeout of the first round of private in-
vestment (Shen et al., 2005). With the state advances, the private sector 
retreated and the state-owned enterprises became the biggest winners in 
expanding generation.
Social Services. China’s new pension system, which has three separate 
programmes (for public employees, urban workers, and rural residents) 
covers about 50 per cent of urban residents and a limited number of rural 
workers (all three are contributory programmes, and the pension program 
for rural residents is voluntary) (Woo et al., 2002). From 2000 onwards, 
the central government has issued many policies and organized conferenc-
es that focused on setting up community-based welfare service systems. 
Furthermore, an increased number of private nursing homes improve care 
quality through the Elder Care Foundation sponsored by the government. 
The Beijing municipal government provides a 100-yuan subsidy for each 
bed per month as an incentive to encourage non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) and the private sector to build and operate nursing homes 
(Wenyi, 2014). Between 2003 and 2007, housing prices increased 66 per 
cent nationwide, making affordable housing a more serious challenge 
and leading to public criticism. In response, the government launched 
the Price Cap Housing, also called double-cap housing, when developers 
acquired land and local governments set a cap in advance on the end price 
they could charge buyers for the land and the housing unit (Zou, 2014).
Health care. The outburst of the SARS crisis in 2003 exposed many prob-
lems existing in China’s public health field, such as lack of governmental 
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functions, problems of marketization and imbalance of health resourc-
es between urban and rural areas, etc. Confronted with concern from 
the whole society, the government developed the Urban Employee Basic 
Medical Insurance System (UEBMI), the New Rural Cooperative Med-
ical System (NRCMS) and the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance 
System (URBMI). A summary of characteristics of the three schemes 
with respect to revenue collection, risk pooling, benefit packages, provid-
er payment methods and other features is provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Comparison of characteristics of UEBMI, NRCMS and URBMI 
(Li et al., 2011)
UEMBI NRCMS URBMI




Rural residents Urban unemployed
Population covered (million) 200 815 118
Annual revenues collected 
(Billion RMB)
304 78.5 Unavailable
Enrolment nature Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary




Focus on  
inpatient care
Focus on inpatient 
care and catastrophic 
outpatient care
Average reimbursement rate 
of inpatient care costs (in %)
66.2 36.4 49.2 
Source: Li et al., 2011
2.4.  After Financial Crisis: Both Recentralization and 
Remunicipalization (2008-Present)
Since 2008, some renationalization or regovernmentalisation of servi-
ces has become popular at the local level. Associated data and academic 
research about this new trend are still scarce because this phenomenon 
has just appeared. However, the media report that some private schools 
(run by the local people) have been converted back to public ownership; 
some buses, tunnels, and bridges have been gradually repurchased by the 
local government; and some private hospitals have become public hos-
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pitals again.2 Cases of repurchase of hospitals have occurred in Jiangxi, 
Shanghai, Zhejiang and other provinces. In 2010, in Zhejiang Province, 
Hangzhou Yuhang District Government announced that 28 hospitals, 
which had been sold to private businesspeople for 75 million RMB a few 
years earlier, were repurchased for 300 million RMB.3
Public Utilities. The private sector’s contribution to the Chinese water 
market declined significantly during the global financial crises (GFC) of 
2008 and 2009, partly because of the fiscal stimulus packages introdu-
ced by the central government, which eventually reversed the tendency of 
local governments to tap private financing (World Bank, 2009). It can be 
seen from Figure 2 that the number of BOT projects increased dramati-
cally between 2002 and 2006, and the number of TOT projects increased 
rapidly in 2004 over the previous year, but it decreased sharply at around 
2008. The similar phenomenon happened in the transport sector. The 
crisis caused the bankruptcy of many private construction companies. For 
example, some 90 per cent of small and medium-sized companies in Gu-
angdong Province met financial problems. As a consequence, a lot of PPP 
contracts were terminated prematurely. Thus, a shift away from PPPs and 
toward the use of SOEs to provide transport infrastructure can be obser-
ved since 2007 (Mu et al., 2011). 
Figure 2: Number of projects by different PPP schemes in China’s water 
market
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In energy provision, Chinese market-oriented reform seems to have re-
verted to the starting point – from an absolute to a relative monopoly 
(Wang, Chen, 2012). As shown in Figure 3, the central state-owned 
generators accounted for 60.44 per cent of the total installed capacity 
in 2010, of which the Big Five (Huadian Corporation, China Guodian 
Corporation, China Datang Corporation, China Huaneng Group, and 
China Power Investment Corporation) made up 49.03 per cent (SERC, 
2011). These Big Five and other central state-owned power generators are 
managed by a central government department, the State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).
Figure 3: The percentage of different ownership in China’s total installed 
capacity in 2010
Source: SERC, 2011
Social Services. Regarding elderly care, in 2009 China introduced a nation-
wide, experimental rural social pension programme based on a number 
of pilot studies in selected rural areas. Government officials expected the 
scheme to cover 10 per cent of rural regions by the end of 2009, about 
50 per cent by 2012, and 100 per cent by 2020. A major feature of this 
scheme is that, for the first time in China’s long history, the government 
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will make direct contributions to a rural pension scheme (Shen, William-
son, 2010). Regarding the housing issue, Premier Wen Jiabao announced 
in early 2010 that China would provide 5.8 million Social Housing units. 
Then he went even further in the following year by expanding the Social 
Housing programme to 36 million units between 2011 and 2016, making 
it the largest affordable housing programme so far (Zou, 2014). The new 
institutions of public services provision are enlarging the scope of cover-
age as shown in Table 2, with the migrants being incorporated into the 
housing framework. 





Peaceful Living Project(PLP) 
Social Housing
1995–1998 Ownership
Low and moderate-income 
households
Cheap-Rent Housing (CRH) 1994-present Rental Very poor households
Economic and Comfortable 
Housing(ECH)
1998-present Ownership




Price-Cap Housing(PLH) 2007-present Ownership
Middle class who cannot 
afford market housing
Public Rent Housing(PRH) 2010-present Rental
Low and moderate-income 
households; new employees, 
and eligible migrants in 
some cities
Source: Zou, 2014
3. A Transformative Approach
According to a transformative approach, public actors involved in reform 
processes are constrained and influenced by three sets of factors or con-
texts – polity features, historical institutional context and environmental 
pressure – seen through a structural-instrumental, cultural and environ-
mental perspectives respectively (Christensen, Lægreid, 2001, 2007). 
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Socialism and Neo-liberalism. Structural, constitutional, and polity factors 
related to a structural-instrumental perspective go some way towards ex-
plaining how political governmental leaders control and handle reform 
processes (Weaver, Rockman, 1993; Olsen, 1992). After China’s accept-
ance of contemporary ideas and strategies of neo-liberalism in the post-re-
form era and party leaders’ embracing the “reform and opening up” policy 
that called for governing by market mechanism and autonomy, the simple 
and over deterministic description like “socialism” or “authoritarianism” 
is unable to capture the nature of this country adequately. Perhaps a hy-
brid neoliberal structural form has emerged in China (Elaine, 2009), or it 
can be called an authoritarian political structure combined with growing 
economic liberalization (Saich, 2004). From this perspective, the broad 
reforms and heterogeneous systems of China (Christensen el al., 2012) 
lead to a mixed delivery mechanism of public services, the hierarchy and 
market coexist in the process of institution evolvement. One the one 
hand, China has moved further down the road of privatization and adopt-
ed policies to boost the role of markets in service provision. On the other 
hand, the CCP’s commitment to socialist ideology means that it retains a 
state-dominant view (Saich, 2008).
Control or Autonomy. Although Chinese central and regional/local govern-
ments are often regarded as two groups of opposite and conflicting actors: 
principal versus agent, reformer versus stakeholder, and supervisor versus 
supervisee (Li, 2010), benign agents versus malign agents, the truth is 
far more complex. Policy deviation instead of flexibility is more common 
in Chinese bureaucracy. Local governments have a tendency to develop 
coping strategies in ways that often sidetrack state policies, or impose 
their own interpretation in the implementation process (Zhou, 2009). It 
can be vividly captured in a popular Chinese saying: “From above there 
are imposed policies, and from below there are evading strategies” (shang 
you zhengce, xia you duice), or “the heaven is high and the emperor is far 
away” (tiangaohuang di yuan). This kind of policy noncompliance occurs 
naturally within China’s extremely hierarchical system (Wedeman, 2001). 
On the one hand, the top-bottom political control maintains the hierarchy 
system in the provision of local public services and ensures the overall 
framework is designed by the central government. On the other hand, 
however, local government has received greater powers over investment 
approval, entry and exit regulation, and resource allocation (Lin et al., 
2005). The newly acquired autonomy leaves room for municipalities take 
630
Dong, L., Q. Cui, T. Christensen (2015) Local Public Services Provision in China ...







over the provision mechanism in accordance with their local conditions 
and interests. It also urges them to take initiative or make experiments to 
improve the provision of public services. Both privatization and remunic-
ipalisation can be understood from this perspective.
3.2. Cultural Perspective
Historical Legacy. A cultural perspective highlights the constraints and 
possibilities lying within established cultures and traditions (Christensen 
et al., 2009). Political-administrative systems over time develop cultur-
al-institutional features of informal norms and values related to gradual 
adaption to internal and external pressure (Selznick, 1957). One of the 
central mechanisms is path dependency (Christensen et al., 2012), which 
suggests that the institutional legacies of the past limit the range of cur-
rent possibilities and/or options in institutional innovation. The first major 
legacy is Maoism, which emphasizes frugality, industry, self-reliance, and 
collective mutual help coupled with revolutionary stresses on sacrifice, the 
proletarian work ethics, and local self-sufficiency (Wong, 1998). Com-
munity service can be regarded as another form of collective organiza-
tion for the mutual aid in urban areas. The concept of self-reliance or 
self-sufficiency, the idea that each locality should use its own resources 
and request only limited support from other levels of government, (Saich, 
2008) remains an important principle for local public service provision. 
There are very few institutionalized channels for gaining support from 
high-level governments to provide public goods, especially in rural areas 
(Tsai, 2002). Additionally, social policies have reflected the bias of the 
official ideology, which has always prioritized the provision of social bene-
fits to the privileged urban population like workers in the SOEs and in the 
government bureaucracy, rather than to villagers.
As the core traditional culture, Confucianism has an important influence 
on social services. Most individuals obtain their physical care and ma-
terial, emotional, and social needs in the family. This basic pattern has 
remained largely intact by the reform (Wong, 2005). When professional 
programmes such as childcare, aid to the handicapped, job placement, 
counselling, and home help remain undeveloped, families bravely take 
over without compensation (Wong, 1998). For example, elderly care is 
rooted in Confucianism, which has always made care for older family 
members, parental devotion (filial piety), and ancestor worship norma-
tive family duties (Zhan, Montgomery, 2003). Despite the tremendous 
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increase in elder care institutions, the proportion of older people in them 
remains small compared to the total number of people who need it. One 
reason is family feelings of responsibility and the related guilt for placing 
one’s parents in an institution (Zhan et al., 2006).
Modernization Concepts. By 1992, agencies such as the United Nations 
Development Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank 
had all been working in China on various development programmes for 
more than a decade. Despite the apparent ideological differences be-
tween these institutions and that of the Chinese Party-state, the scope for 
cooperation and the transfer of technologies of government was consid-
erable insofar as they shared a common discourse of developmentalism. 
Although the Chinese governmental structure might seem far removed 
from the UK and New Zealand, there are the same kinds of pressures that 
have resulted in the terms of “New Public Management” or “Reinventing 
Government”, impacting on institutions and policies (Kamarck, 2004). 
Local service provision focusing of efficiency reflects this trend, as do pri-
vatization of hospitals and schools, competitive tendering, or PPP (Alfen 
et al., 2009). The last decade or so has partly added to and partly modified 
this trend in local service provision. One of the doctrines is “New Social 
Governance”, which was extensively used in western scholarly and gov-
ernment writings and later taken up in China. The other is “Post-NPM”, 
emerging first in New Zealand and Australia in the late 1990s and focus-
ing on recentralization and increase coordination (Christensen, Lægreid, 
2007). This reform wave is empirically exemplified in central government 
or provinces trying to increase control in different ways – either struc-
turally, through new policies, or economy-related, through local service 
provision.
3.3. Environmental Perspective
The reform and its participants have to cope with complex environments. 
The technical environment generates mechanisms or pressures for change 
caused by political, economic, technological, or social changes. The in-
stitutional environment comprises ideas and beliefs about practices that 
are communicated through organizational processes such as myths and 
symbols shared among organizational leaders about what is “modern” or 
“best practices” (Christensen et al., 2012).
Central-Local Relationship – Fiscal Structure. Changes in the fiscal system 
have had an important impact on the local public service provision through 
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the incentives for and constraints on local government. China dispersed 
its highly centralized fiscal management system (1949-1978) with various 
forms of fiscal contracting systems (1979-1993) and later a tax sharing 
system to recentralize the financial sources (1994-present). Prior to 1978, 
fiscal revenues and expenditures had been centralized in the Chinese 
state bureaucracy. Profits and taxes collected by local governments were 
handed over to the centre (Peng, 2001). With the introduction of fiscal 
contracts in 1988, provinces were allowed to retain a specified propor-
tion of revenues collected, over a targeted amount. Provinces had such 
agreements with counties and small cities, which in turn made similar 
agreements with townships and small towns (Walder, 2007). Therefore, 
the central government’s share of budgetary revenues decreased dramati-
cally (Wong, 1997). By 1993, the sub-national share of total fiscal revenue 
had reached 78.9 per cent. A tax sharing system (fenshuizhi), which es-
tablished central and local government tax bases, has been implemented 
since 1994 as a measure of recentralizing fiscal management.
The conflict between shouldering more financial responsibility for social 
services and dramatically decreased revenue (Figures 3 and 4), the lack 
of financial capabilities and adequate incentive for public services stimu-
lates a strong urge in local governments to pursue financial resources and 
transfer the responsibilities of public services to the market and the indi-
vidual. Even if the central government initiates a new programme, which 
is beneficial for the public interests, local governments sometimes show 
little enthusiasm about it. Take the PCH programmes for example. Local 
governments did not want to allocate land that could be developed in 
the ways that yield greater benefits, and were worried that the PCH pro-
gramme could jeopardize the local housing market. As a result, only those 
cities with strong fiscal capacities enacted the programme (Zou, 2014).
Now local governments rely on transfers from the central government to 
balance their budgets. Transfers are in the form of tax rebates, general 
transfers, fixed subsidies or submission under the old system, budgetary 
subsidies, and appropriations for special projects (matching grants) (Li, 
Lin, 2011). With the central government giving priority to public social 
welfare, remunicipalisation generates a new financial stimulus for local 
governments. Nevertheless, the lower the level of government, the less 
money is available for transfer, and the main burden still falls on under-
funded local governments, leading to great variation in provision of servic-
es, so the county and township level governments are in a difficult fiscal 
position.
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Figure 3: Change in income of central and local governments related to 
tax distribution system 
Source: Data complied according to China Statistic Yearbook 1978–2000
Figure 4: Change in expenses of central and local governments related to 
tax distribution system 
Source: Data complied according to China Statistic Yearbook 1978–2000
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Political Structure. The evolution of performance evaluation has had a pro-
found effect on the provision of local public services. It can be divided 
into three stages. Prior to 1978, the Chinese performance appraisal pro-
cess had become politicized, resulting in appraisal findings that were ac-
tually political outcomes. At the second stage, with the focus on econom-
ic growth and structural adjustment and stabilization, insufficient policy 
attention to public services provision persisted through the 1980s and 
into the first half of the 1990s. The motivation from cadre responsibility 
system, performance contracts and political contraction system can be 
institutionalized as “pressure system” (yalixing tizhi), or “the tournament 
system” (jinbiaosai tizhi). This evaluation system not only distracted the 
local bureaucracies from improving social services, but also took the risk 
of the PPP projects in public utilities. Since local governments devoted far 
too much attention to their career achievement, it was quite natural for 
them to make wrong decisions such as inaccurate predictions of demand 
for the projects.
In September 2004, Hu Jintao proposed building a harmonious socie-
ty and called for conducting reform measures to stimulate social vitali-
ty, promote social justice and fairness, enhance the sense of law and the 
sense of integrity in the whole society, and safeguard social stability and 
unity. This move clearly signalled a shift in the CCP’s focus from exclusive 
promotion of economic growth to solving increasing social tensions (Gao, 
2010). Following this, some local governments implemented a modified 
performance measurement system and gave higher priority to the perfor-
mance of public services, especially social services.
Local Government and Enterprise. The changing relationship between the 
municipalities and enterprise has influenced the degree of privatization 
and the mechanism of local public services. In the 1990s, financial de-
centralization and property rights reform promoted a tendency of local 
government to be entrepreneurial for increasing revenue, and local actors 
were more concerned with participating in the economic activities and 
providing an attractive environment. Some new terms were generated, 
like “entrepreneurial state” (Blecher, 1991), “industrial firms” (Walder, 
1995), “local state corporatism” (Oi, 1999). They reflected the govern-
ment intervention in the private areas and private enterprise dependence 
on the governments. This intertwined relationship distorted the marketi-
zation of local public services provision and limited the use of some meas-
ures such as contracting. After the Ninth National People’s Congress in 
March 1998, the leadership began to promote the separation between 
government and enterprise. Local governments were forbidden to involve 
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in enterprise activities and began to become the independent regulators. 
There was a shift from the old “command and control” forms of regulation 
to the one characterized by contracts and covenants between public and 
private actors, and to information management (Saich, 2008).
However, it is still essential for private investors to strive for the govern-
ments’ cooperation and assistance, but this may substantially increase the 
cost of such cooperation and assistance due to the corruption of some 
local government officials (Wang, 2002). In addition to money, pro-
ject companies have to spend a lot of time and effort in dealing with 
the government, which also has a negative influence on the efficiency of 
the companies’ operation, management, and profits (Ho, 2006). Local 
governments still tend to transact with the divested SOEs, service units, 
or supervised NPOs with which they still have financial, personnel, or 
personal ties (Teets, 2012). Yongjian Ke’s research about the probability 
and consequence of risks in China’s PPP project has shown that the top 
ten risks are government’s intervention, poor political decision making, 
financial risk, government’s reliability, market demand change, corrup-
tion, subjective evaluation, interest rate, immature judicial system, and 
inflation (Ke et al., 2011). Apparently, it is still a way to go before local 
governments are able to provide a stable external environment and be-
come a mature regulator for the PPP Corporation. 
Local Government and Civil Society. In the post-reform era, Chinese cit-
izens’ demands for public services are increasing comprehensively and 
rapidly, which also affects the institutional environment, i.e. local govern-
ments have to be increasingly sensitive to how the public see their activ-
ities. However, the authoritarian political system has so far thwarted the 
development of ‘voice’ mechanisms vital to the demand-side information; 
policies are often decided behind closed doors without researching and 
documenting the need of the public for public services (Li, 2008). As a 
substitute to the formal institutions, public demands are expressed in dif-
ferent ways, usually through protest. In dozens of cities in the early 1990, 
dissatisfied pensioners (Hurst, O’Brien, 2002) engaged in protests over 
unpaid benefits, over unfair remuneration in the distribution of severance 
pay from bankrupt firms, and so on. These protests highlighted the failure 
of the reform to provide adequate retirement incomes to the millions who 
entered the ranks of urban retirees in the 1990s (Frazier, 2004). Conse-
quently, they pushed a new pension reform and the government started to 
increase its participation and investment in this area.
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Besides citizens, non-profit organizations also play a positive role. One of 
the reasons why the provision public of services has become more diver-
sified is that local government leaders are more willing to cooperate with 
non-governmental organizations. Li Jiang, secretary general of Hunan 
province contends, “The government can’t manage, shouldn’t manage, or 
doesn’t manage well…of course, in the development of social organiza-
tions there is the need for a process of adjustment, this is a new task for 
our country” (Ng Tze-Wei, 2011). However, many factors hinder Chi-
na’s civil society development and its influence on the services delivery, 
including exogenous factors such as the regulatory system and ideology, 
as well as endogenous factors such as the lack of professional compe-
tences among NGOs themselves (Wang, 2014). Local governments keep 
imposing constraints on the autonomy of civil society organizations. Le-
gal requirements and layers of governmental bureaucracy thwart many 
organizations that are too small and have too few resources to meet the 
registration requirements (Xu, Chou, 2011). The work strategy of most 
NGOs that have already been registered is based on maintaining close 
government relations to ensure their continued existence and political ac-
ceptance. Some may even nest within government bodies using official 
personnel and resources to carry out their programmes (Saich, 2008). For 
example, the service centres for elderly care are independent of the gov-
ernment and run as partially non-governmental organisations. However, 
as the government is seen as the chief programme designer, the service 
centres merely play a role of policy implementer. Due to government 
intervention, community service providers enjoy limited autonomy and 
have to shoulder part of administrative burden transferred to them by the 
government (Wenyi, 2014). Thus, although the non-profit participation is 
being increased, we are still far from creating the networks or governance 
structure in the public services provision, because civil society is weaker 
and more immature than the hierarchy system and the market. 
4. Comparison between Europe and China
The development path of service delivery in Europe and China has many 
commonalities as well as differences. In the first stage, due to the stand-
ard communist system, the provision of local public services in China was 
similar to that in central-eastern European (CEE) countries, public util-
ities were in state ownership, and provision of social services was based 
on workplace or families. The fact that public utilities were owned by the 
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state but established and operated by local governments, which lacked 
the financial power and resources, was not of importance. After 1978, 
with the process of both financial and administrative decentralization, al-
most all responsibilities of public service were transferred to municipali-
ties. However, this situation did not last long. Local governments had to 
fulfil the GDP growth assignments, which was vital for their promotion 
by the superior governments. Furthermore, the new financial reform of 
recentralizing fiscal management had made many localities take too many 
expenditure responsibilities that were out of their financial capabilities. 
Those circumstances stimulated local governments to initiate a pro-mar-
ket reform to transfer their burden to enterprises influenced by neoliberal 
economic policies and Deng Xiaoping’s famous Southern Tour of 1992. 
Thus, the provision of local public services in China showed the conver-
gence with that of European countries in the 1990s, which was featured 
by marketization and privatization intending to replace the ‘in house’ and 
administratively integrated provision of services with ‘outsourcing’ them 
to private sectors. The privatization in this stage was rather immature.
At the beginning of the new century, there was partial demunicipalisation, 
featured by the increased state involvement and deeper pluralism in the 
delivery of local public services. Specifically, central government put equal 
access to basic public services on the work agenda and increased its in-
vestment in social services provision, particularly in rural areas. Regarding 
public utilities, there was a new trend of public-private partnership model 
replacing common privatization. Diversification of social services provi-
ders increased further by the emergence of civil society-type formations. 
A larger number of services, such as elderly care, have been outsourced to 
a larger number of organizationally distinct providers.
In 2008, the global scale financial crisis affected both European countries 
and China. The private sector’s contribution to the public utilities market 
declined significantly. Some local governments attempted to ‘remunici-
palise’ the previously ‘outsourced’ or (asset) privatized services, such as 
buses, tunnels, and bridges, partly because of the fiscal stimulus packages 
introduced by the central government. At the same time, “recentraliza-
tion” also occurred, a shift away from PPP adoption towards the use of 
SOEs to provide transport infrastructure. A new type of monopoly was 
developed in energy sector – the state advanced, the private sector retrea-
ted. Compared to public utilities, social services were more divergent than 
in most Europe countries. Although the ‘marketization’ and ‘diversifica-
tion’ are still going on, both central government and local governments 
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get a momentum and invest more in the provision of social services, the 
situation is highly hybrid.
Has public service provision in China experienced “pendulum-type” mo-
vements? A clear distinction needs to be made between the provision of 
public utilities and social services. For public utilities, the answer seems 
to be positive. For social services, the answer is different.
5. Conclusion
The institutional change of local public service in China is incremental. 
Although it shows some convergence with the trends in certain European 
countries, it retains special features shaped by disequilibrium and insta-
bility. China’s four-legged stool of welfare support is operating with two 
long legs (state and family) and two truncated legs (civil society and the 
market), thus creating imbalance in the system and perpetuating existing 
inequalities (Saich, 2008).
However, there is no doubt that public service provision in China has 
undergone a fundamental shift, an increase in government capacities as 
a prerequisite for an effective market and civil society to function. In a 
situation when most local governments around the world try to create new 
partnerships with society and market to provide better public services, 
China is no exception.
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LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES PROVISION IN CHINA –  
AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Summary
The article reviews the institutional change of local public service provision in 
China. The emphasis is placed on the characteristics and reasons of the evo-
lution process. The first part presents the characteristics and changes of local 
public service provision in five periods. The second part analyses public service 
provision through structural-instrumental, cultural and environmental perspec-
tives. The third part explores whether China has experienced “pendulum-type” 
movements like some Europe countries. The institutional change of local public 
service in China is incremental. Although it shows some convergence with the 
trend of certain European countries, it retains special features.
Keywords: China, local public service, institutional change, remunicipaliza-
tion
PRUŽANJE LOKALNIH JAVNIH SLUŽBI U KINI –  
INSTITUCIONALNA ANALIZA
Sažetak
U radu se analizira institucionalna promjena u pružanju lokalnih javnih službi 
u Kini. Naglasak je na karakteristikama i razlozima procesa evolucije. U pr-
vom se dijelu prezentiraju karakteristike i promjene u pružanju lokalnih javnih 
službi u pet faza. U drugom se dijelu pružanje lokalnih javnih službi analizi-
ra iz strukturalno-instrumentalne, kulturološke i okolišne perspektive. Treći dio 
istražuje ima li razvoj pružanja lokalnih javnih službi u Kini značajke kruci-
jalnih promjena nalik na one u europskim zemljama (npr. remunicipalizacija). 
Institucionalna promjena lokalnih javnih službi u Kini je postupna. Premda 
postoje određene sličnosti s trendovima u nekim europskim zemljama, ona ipak 
zadržava svoje specifične osobine.
Ključne riječi: Kina, lokalne javne službe, institucionalna promjena, remuni-
cipalizacija 
